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UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE 
 	  In	   both	   common	   everyday	   language	   and	   high	   theory	   one	   is	   liable	   to	   find	   in	   the	  meaning	  of	  shame	  the	  presence	  of	  disgrace.	  Yet	  this	  essay	  will	  argue	  that	  these	  two	  concepts	   are	   quite	   distinct	   and	   that	   there	   is	   a	   particular	   cultural	   articulation	   of	  shame	   and	   disgrace	   that	   runs	   counter	   to	   the	   normative	   understanding	   of	   their	  symbiotic	  unity.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  primary	  difference	  is	  that	  where	  shame	  is	   embodied,	   or	   an	   emotion	   fundamentally	   of	   the	   body,	   disgrace	   is	   facialised	   and	  thus	  able	  to	  rid	   itself	  of	   the	  body	   in	   its	  capacity	  as	   the	  privileged	  representative	  of	  the	   face.	   Disgrace	   contains	   within	   its	   discursive	   structure	   the	   promise	   of	  transcendence	   unavailable	   to	   shame	   because	   it	   is	   able	   to	   unburden	   itself	   of	   the	  restrictions	   of	   materiality.	   This	   distinction	   thus	   reveals	   itself	   to	   be	   gendered	   in	  character	  in	  its	  reprisal	  of	  the	  familiar	  Cartesian	  dialectic.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  cultural	  and	   metaphysical	   meaning	   of	   shame	   takes	   on	   a	   feminine	   character	   through	   its	  association	  with	  the	  body.	  This	  is	  further	  reinforced	  by	  the	  historical	  positioning	  of	  the	  female	  body	  as	  privileged	  representative	  of	  sexual	  shame.	  In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  essay	   I	   draw	   from	   J.M.	   Coetzee’s	   novel	   Disgrace	   as	   a	   text	   that	   makes	   visible	   the	  tension	  between	  shame	  and	  disgrace	  as	  one	  between	  immanent	  feminine	  shame	  and	  transcendent	  masculine	   disgrace.1	   In	   this	   instance,	   the	   literary	   text	   functions	   as	   a	  tangible	  demonstration	  of	  the	  gendered	  constellation	  of	  the	  two	  terms.	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English-­‐language	   speakers	   usually	   invoke	   shame	   and	   disgrace	   to	   mean	   the	  same	   thing;	   that	   is,	   a	   feeling	   of	   deficiency	   in	   the	   self	   which	   is	   entirely	   contingent	  upon	   the	   real	   or	   imagined	   presence	   of	   judging	   others.	   The	   dictionary	   definitions	  certainly	  appear	  to	  overlap:	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  (hereafter	  OED)	  definition	  of	   disgrace	   (noun	   and	   verb	   forms)	   includes	   ‘loss	   of	   general	   or	   public	   respect;	  ignominy,	   shame’;	   ‘put	   to	   shame’;	   ‘bring	   shame	   or	   discredit	   on’;	   and	   ‘a	   cause	   of	  shame	   or	   reproach’.2	   Under	   ‘shame’	   we	   find	   a	   far	   greater	   range	   of	   meanings	   and	  expressions,	  including	  ‘disgrace;	  loss	  of	  esteem	  or	  reputation’	   ‘infliction	  of	  disgrace	  or	  injury’	  and	  ‘a	  person	  who	  or	  thing	  which	  is	  the	  cause	  or	  source	  of	  disgrace’.	  	  And	  yet,	  even	  in	  the	  intermingling	  of	  shame	  and	  disgrace	  there	  is	  a	  curious	  and	  subtle	  difference	  to	  be	  observed,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  disgrace	  acts	  as	  the	  messenger	  of	  shame,	   as	   that	   which	   ‘brings’,	   ‘puts’	   or	   ‘inflicts’	   shame	   upon	   a	   person.	   Moreover,	  when	   the	   fuller	   meanings	   of	   the	   two	   terms	   are	   taken	   into	   account,	   further	  qualifications	  can	  be	  discerned.	  Consider,	   for	   instance,	   the	  composition	  of	  disgrace	  as	   a	  despoiled	   externalised	   image	   and	  a	  demotion	   in	  public	   stature	  or	   rank	   in	   the	  following:	   ‘loss	   of	   high	   favour	   or	   respect,	   downfall	   from	   a	   position	   of	   honour’;	  ‘degrade	   from	  a	  position	  of	  honour’;	   ‘Spoil	   the	   (esp.	  outward)	  grace	  of’;	   ‘disfigure’.	  By	  contrast,	   shame,	   in	   the	  noun	   form,	   is	  described	   in	  explicitly	  emotional	   terms	  as	  the	   ‘feeling	  of	  humiliation	  or	  distress	  arising	   from	   the	   consciousness	  of	   something	  dishonourable	  or	  ridiculous	   in	  one’s	  own	  or	  another’s	  behaviour	  or	  circumstances,	  or	   from	   a	   situation	   offensive	   to	   one’s	   own	   or	   another’s	   sense	   of	   propriety	   or	  decency’.	  In	  the	  verb	  form,	  the	  act	  of	  shaming	  means	  ‘cause	  to	  feel	  shame’,	  ‘cause	  to	  feel	  or	  appear	  inferior	  in	  comparison’.	  Nowhere	  do	  we	  find	  in	  any	  of	  the	  OED	  definitions	  of	  disgrace	  an	  indication	  that	  it	   is	   a	   feeling.	   Disgrace	   is	   brought	   from	   without	   (‘put	   to	   shame’),	   or	   is	   directed	  outward	   from	   its	   source	   (‘a	   person	  who	   or	   thing	  which	   is	   the	   cause	   or	   source	   of	  disgrace’).	   The	   disfigurement	   implicit	   in	   disgrace	   concerns	   only	   the	   external	  appearance	  or	  figure;	  to	  ‘disfigure’	  is	  to	  spoil,	  deform	  or	  deface	  an	  appearance.	  These	  accretions	   of	   meaning	   lead	   me	   to	   surmise	   that	   the	   two	   terms	   are	   indicative	   of	   a	  variation	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  self.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  shame	  affixes	  to	  the	  ego,	  and	  on	  the	   other,	   disgrace	   claims	   the	   public	   persona,	   the	   outward-­‐facing	   self	   visible	   to	  others.	  In	  describing	  shame	  as	  the	  ‘mental	  picture	  of	  disgrace’,	  Aristotle	  locates	  it	  in	  the	  ego,	  with	  disgrace	  as	  the	  public	  loss	  of	  the	  other’s	  good	  opinion.3
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While	  shame	  is	  an	  emotion,	  disgrace	  can	  be	  described	  as	  an	  ‘incorporeal	  event’	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  former.	  Disgrace	  is	  thus	  a	  transitive	  external	  event	  that	  disfigures	  outward	  appearance	  and	  reduces	  social	  station;	  it	  is	  also	  an	  incorporeal	  conduit	  for	  the	  autonomic	  affect	  of	  shame	  (for	  example,	  blushing).	  If	  shame	  appears	  in	  public,	  it	  does	   so	   through	   the	   body.	   Shame	   is	   experienced	   in	   and	   through	   the	   body—as	   a	  blush,	   a	   turning	   away	   of	   the	   head,	   a	   lowering	   of	   the	   eye—but	   disgrace	   is	   an	  incorporeal	   expression	   of	   disfigurement	   of	   the	   abstract	   face	   one	   turns	   toward	  others.	   Loss	   of	   face,	   or	   social	   standing,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   an	   ‘incorporeal	  transformation’,	   a	   statement	   in	   language	   attributable	   to	   a	   body	   that	   experiences	   a	  change	   in	   its	   state	   of	   affairs.4	   As	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   explain	   it,	   incorporeal	  transformations	  are	  statements	  that	  apply	  certain	  attributes	  to	  bodies:	  Bodies	  have	  an	  age,	   they	  mature	   and	  grow	  old;	  but	  majority,	   retirement,	  any	   given	   age	   category,	   are	   incorporeal	   transformations	   that	   are	  immediately	  attributed	  to	  bodies	  in	  particular	  societies.	  ‘You	  are	  no	  longer	  a	  child’:	   this	  statement	  concerns	  an	   incorporeal	   transformation,	  even	   if	   it	  applies	  to	  bodies	  and	  inserts	  itself	  into	  their	  actions	  and	  passions.5	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  disgrace	  is	  a	  transition	  or	  a	  temporal	  passage;	  it	  is	  a	  transitive	  effect.	   The	   ‘expression’	   of	   disgrace	   transforms	   the	   elevated	   to	   the	   base.	   Where	  shame	   infects	   and	   spreads	   contagion	   through	   skin	   feeling	   (feeling	   ashamed	   of	  oneself	   and	   feeling	   ashamed	   on	   behalf	   of	   someone	   else	   are,	   as	   Sedgwick	   has	  demonstrated,	  proximate),	  disgrace	  traverses	  the	  edges	  of	  bodies	  in	  time.6	  Disgrace	  is	   concerned	   with	   image	   management—as	   the	   progenitor	   of	   ‘public	   relations’—whereas	   shame	   exposes	   a	   vulnerability	   within	   personhood	   itself	   as	   that	   which	  ‘strikes	   deepest	   into	   the	   heart	   of	  man’.7	   Shame	   ‘is	   the	  place	  where	   the	  question	   of	  identity	  arises	  most	  originarily	  and	  most	   relationally’.8	   In	   this	   sense,	   shame	  reifies	  social	  disgrace	  in	  the	  person	  as	  an	  ontological	  quality.	  	  The	   reason	   that	   shame	   is	   so	   wrenchingly	   painful	   is	   because	   it	   exposes	   an	  intractably	   flawed	   selfhood—a	   ‘true’	   self,	   if	   you	  will.	   The	   link	  between	   shame	  and	  truth	   is	   conveyed	   in	   nineteenth-­‐century	   naturalist	   Alexander	   von	   Humboldt’s	  description	   of	   the	   blush	   as	   a	   revelation	   of	   deceit:	   ‘How	   can	   those	   be	   trusted	  who	  know	  not	  how	   to	  blush?’9	  Burgess	   (1839)	  narrates	  a	   similar	   tale	  of	   the	   role	  of	   the	  blush	  in	  exposing	  duplicity.	  He	  tells	  of	  his	  experience	  at	  a	  hypnotism	  demonstration	  given	   by	   French	   exponent	   of	   Animal	  Magnetism,	   Baron	   du	   Potet.	   After	   the	   Baron	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pinches	  and	  pricks	  his	  participant’s	  skin	  with	  pins,	  to	  show	  her	  insensibility	  as	  proof	  of	   her	   hypnotic	   state,	   a	   fly	  wanders	   across	   her	   face	   and	   the	   onlookers	   notice	   her	  cheek	   muscles	   move.	   The	   baron	   can’t	   explain	   it	   and	   one	   disbelieving	   audience	  member	  suggests	  rather	  pointedly	  that	  the	  woman	  herself	  could	  perhaps	  explain	  the	  occurrence,	  whereupon,	  in	  Burgess’	  account,	  the	  Baron’s	  female	  participant	  betrays	  the	  display	  as	  a	  trick—with	  a	  blush:	  An	  intense	  blush,	  in	  which	  not	  only	  the	  face,	  but	  the	  neck,	  chest,	  and	  ears	  of	  the	  magnetised	  lady	  were	  engaged,	  immediately	  succeeded	  this	  remark;	  it	  was	  a	  satisfactory	  answer	  to	  the	  gentleman’s	  charge	  of	  deception	  on	  the	  girl’s	  part,	  and	  needs	  no	  further	  comment.	  It	  is	  another	  striking	  illustration	  of	  the	  soul	  and	  conscience	  being	  ever	  on	  the	  watch	  to	  side	  with	  truth	  and	  justice	  against	  the	  deceitfulness	  of	  the	  human	  heart.10	  Thus,	   Burgess	   elaborates	   upon	   his	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘True	   Blush’	   as	   the	   external	  disclosure	   of	   a	   private	   felony.	   This	   is	   why	   shaming	   the	   other	   is	   such	   a	   powerful	  mechanism	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  social	   identity	  within	  unequal	  power	  structures.	  If	  shame	  (or	  shamelessness)	  can	  be	   found	  to	  reside	  within	  persons,	  quite	  apart	   from	  disgraceful	   actions,	   it	   then	   becomes	   bound	   to	   processes	   of	   social	   abjection	   (like	  racism,	   sexism	   and	   homophobia)	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   degeneracy	   as	   a	  constitutional	  characteristic;	  shame	  is	  thus	  an	  emotion	  which	  can	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  reveal	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  debased	  soul	  through	  the	  body.	  In	   the	   dominant	   sexual	   narratives	   of	   Western	   culture,	   especially	   in	  psychoanalytic	  discourse,	  shame	  is	  ontologically	  buried	  in	  the	  female	  genitals	  as	  that	  which	  not	  only	  already	   is	   concealed	   (in	   comparison	   to	   the	  upstanding	   self-­‐evident	  visibility	  of	   the	  penis)	  but	  also	  ought	   to	  be	   concealed.	  Freud’s	  work	   is	  particularly	  enlightening	  because	  of	  the	  way	  it	  makes	  visible	  strongly	  held	  cultural	  beliefs	  about	  shame’s	  sexed	  location:	  ‘Shame,	  which	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  feminine	  characteristic	  
par	  excellence	  …	  has	  as	  its	  purpose,	  we	  believe,	  concealment	  of	  genital	  deficiency.’11	  In	   addition,	   the	   1811	   Dictionary	   of	   the	   Vulgar	   Tongue	   makes	   reference	   to	   the	  shameful	  status	  of	  the	  female	  genitals	  in	  declaring	  the	  word	  ‘c**t	  …	  a	  nasty	  name	  for	  a	   nasty	   thing’,	   the	   typographic	   censorship	   via	   asterisk	   notwithstanding.12	   More	  recently,	   in	  a	  2001	  study	  on	   female	  genital	   slang	   terms	  used	   in	  Britain,	  Braun	  and	  Kitzinger	   found	   that,	   compared	   with	   male	   genitalia,	   ‘female	   genitalia	   were	  significantly	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   described	   euphemistically’,	   suggesting	   a	   persistent	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attachment	  of	  the	  female	  genitals	  to	  shame.13	  And,	  most	  recently,	  a	  furore	  erupted	  in	  US	   politics	   when	   the	   Michigan	   State	   representative	   Lisa	   Brown	   was	   barred	   from	  speaking	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   State	  House	  when	   she	   invoked	   the	  word	   ‘vagina’	   in	   a	  speech	  criticising	   further	  state	  regulation	  of	  abortion.	  House	  Speaker	   James	  Bolger	  justified	   his	   silencing	   of	   Brown	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   ‘lack	   of	   decorum’.14	   But	   the	  seventeenth-­‐century	   female-­‐specific	   meaning	   of	   shame	   found	   in	   the	   OED	   is	  especially	   arresting.	   The	   noun	   form	   of	   shame	   contains	   the	   following	   definition:	   ‘A	  woman’s	  loss	  of	  chastity	  or	  a	  violation	  of	  her	  honour.’	  The	  question	  to	  be	  posed	  here	  is	  if	  shame	  and	  disgrace	  are	  so	  aligned,	  then	  why	  do	  we	  not	  find	  this	  definition	  under	  the	   latter	   term?	   I	  would	  suggest	   it	   is	  because	  central	   to	   the	   figuration	  of	   shame	  as	  feminine	  are	  Western	  cultural	  narratives	  obsessed	  with	   female	  chastity	  and	  sexual	  violation.	  	  The	  violability	  or	   ‘honour’	  of	   the	   female	  body	  has	  a	  quite	  particular	  historical	  relationship	   to	   shame.	   In	   her	   article	   ‘The	   Shame	   of	   the	   Rose:	   A	   Paradox’,	   Mary	  Flannery	  argues	  that	  medieval	  femininity	  was	  governed	  by,	  and	  valued	  according	  to,	  the	   concept	   of	   honour	   as	   the	   preservation	   of	   chastity.15	   Shame	   was	   the	   barrier	  erected	  to	  protect	  female	  honour	  and	  prevent	  licentiousness,	  but	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  this	  alliance	  was	  that	  female	  honour	  also	  came	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  violability.	  Flannery	  turns	   to	   the	   thirteenth-­‐century	   poem	   Le	   Roman	   de	   la	   Rose	   to	   illustrate	   the	  paradoxical	   relationship	   between	   the	   feminine	   imperative	   to	   maintain	   bodily	  honour	   and	   the	   masculine	   duty	   to	   vanquish	   it.	   For	   Flannery,	   the	   ‘troubling	  treatment’	   of	   female	   shame	   in	   the	   poem	   puts	   women	   in	   a	   contradictory	   position,	  where	   they	   are	   ‘expected	   to	   adhere	   to	   honourable	   ideals	   of	   female	   shamefastness	  while	   ideals	   of	   masculine	   behaviour	   read	   this	   shamefastness	   as	   something	   to	   be	  overcome—if	   necessary,	   through	   force’.16	   Female	   restraint,	   the	   protection	   of	   her	  privates	   and	  her	  withdrawal	   into	   the	  private	   sphere	  was	   to	  be	  distinguished	   from	  masculine	  activity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  aggressiveness.17	  Flannery	  demonstrates	  that	   female	   genital	   shame	   and	  privacy	   are	   explicitly	   linked,	   so	   that	   for	   a	  medieval	  woman	   to	   occupy	   public	   space	   is	   to	   break	   the	   code	   of	   feminine	   propriety:	   ‘only	  “shameless”	  or	  dishonourable	  women—women	  with	   little	  or	  no	  apparent	   sense	  of	  or	  sensitivity	  to	  shame—inhabit	  it’.18	  The	  spurious	  ‘protection’	  of	  privacy	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  much	  of	  a	  protection	  at	  all,	  especially	  where	  medieval	  law	  was	  concerned:	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According	  to	  medieval	  codes	  of	  law,	  rape	  and	  female	  honour	  defined	  each	  other.	  A	  woman	  could	  only	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  rape	  if	  she	  was	  ‘honourable’—that	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  she	  was	  chaste.	  And	  an	  honourable	  woman	  was	  defined	  by	  her	   steadfast	   adherence	   to	   sexual	   continence,	   which	   could	   only	   be	  damaged	  against	  her	  will—that	  is	  to	  say,	  through	  rape.19	  The	   terrible	   paradox	   to	  which	   Flannery	   refers	   is	   that	   if	   rapability	   defines	   honour,	  then	   it	  becomes	   impossible	   for	  women	  to	  uphold	  an	  honour	  already	  defined	  by	   its	  violation.	  	  The	   construction	   of	   female	   honour	   evident	   in	   medieval	   rape	   law	   also	  automatically	  implies	  a	  distinction	  between	  women	  who	  do	  not	  defend	  their	  honour	  and	   those	   who	   do.	   In	   current	   terminology,	   this	   equates	   to	   a	   difference	   between	  ‘sluts’	   and	   ‘ladies’.	   Beverly	   Skeggs	   notes	   that	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   ‘lady’	   in	   the	  eighteenth	   and	   nineteenth	   centuries	   was	   a	   classed	   one	   that	   coded	   white	   middle-­‐class	   femininity	   as	   respectable.20	   As	   a	   ‘classed	   sign’,	   femininity	   was	   immersed	   in	  power	  relations	  and	  could	  be	  called	  upon	  in	  the	  service	  of	  marking	  out	  differences	  between	   self	   and	   other:	   ‘Working-­‐class	   women—both	   Black	   and	   White—were	  coded	   as	   the	   sexual	   and	   deviant	   other	   against	   which	   femininity	   was	   defined.’21	  Feminine	   shame	   thus	   has	   a	   classed	   and	   raced	   dimension,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  articulation	  of	  shame	  as	  a	  barrier	   to	  be	  broken	  down	  by	  masculine	  sexual	  activity,	  or,	  in	  Freudian	  terms,	  as	  the	  hollow	  space	  where	  a	  penis	  should	  be.	  The	  attachment	  of	  shame	  to	  abjected	  identity	  (for	  example	  the	  female-­‐specific	   identity	  of	  the	   ‘slut’)	  invokes	   a	   timeless,	   eternal	   essence	   indelibly	   marked	   on	   the	   body.	   Disgrace,	   by	  contrast,	   is	   temporally	   dependent,	   and	   experienced	   as	   a	   public	   event.	   The	  downward	  slide	  from	  lady	  to	  slut	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  disgraceful	  fall	  from	  respectability,	  but	  is	  embodied	  as	  shame	  in	  the	  genitals	  themselves.	  Further,	  women	  who	  embody	  sexual	   deviance	   are	   already	   shamed	   by	   dint	   of	   their	   oppositional	   relation	   to	  respectable	  femininity,	  a	  shame	  that	  is	  cast	  as	  eternal	  and	  essential	  difference.	  	  What	   I	   am	   particularly	   concerned	  with	   here	   is	   the	   shame	   of	   the	   other	   as	   an	  embodied	  difference	  that	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  claim	  to	  humanity	  and	  respect	  as	  disgrace.	   To	   be	   disgraced	   one	   must	   first	   occupy	   a	   position	   of	   honour,	   which	   is	  founded	  upon	  the	  principle	  of	  equality—to	  hold	  someone	  in	  high	  regard	  is	  to	  accept	  that	   person	   as	   possessing	   characteristics	   that	   one	   values	   in	   oneself.	   Given	   that	  virginity	  is	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  femininity	  that	  is	  over-­‐valued	  in	  female	  bodies—and	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essential	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  virile	  masculinity	  as	  the	  obstacle	  to	  be	  overcome—what	  we	   find	   is	   that	   there	   is	  a	  specific	  heterosexual	  organisation	  of	  desire	   that	  positions	  male	  and	  female	  bodies	  differently	  in	  relation	  to	  dishonour.	  This	  means	  that	  shame’s	  gender-­‐specific	  attachment	  to	  virginity	  is	  that	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  attach	  to	  the	  female	  body	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  its	  ‘natural’	  habitat.	  Shame	  thus	  becomes	  a	  naturalised	  attribute	  of	   the	   female	   body	  not	   only	   because	   of	   its	   association	  with	   the	  body—signified	   in	  phallocentric	  Western	  thought	  as	  Woman—but	  also	  because	  of	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  eternal	  feminine	  defined	  through	  essential	  violability.	  Shame	  does	  not	  have	  quite	  the	  same	  intractable	  relationship	  to	  the	  male	  body,	  which	  is	  more	  culturally	  disposed	  to	  bearing	  the	  signs	  of	  disgrace.	  Take,	   for	   instance,	   the	   public	   disgrace	   of	   former	   US	   president	   Bill	   Clinton,	  impeached	  on	  charges	  of	  perjury	  and	  obstruction	  of	  justice	  for	  asking	  intern	  Monica	  Lewinsky	   to	   lie	   about	   their	   extra-­‐marital	   affair.	   Although	   Clinton	   was	   seen	   to	  disgrace	   the	   public	   office	   and	   offend	   public	   morality	   because	   of	   his	   perceived	  inability	   to	   control	   his	   wandering	   penis/cigar,	   this	   is	   countered	   by	   the	   culturally	  validated	  assumption	  that	  male	  promiscuity	  is	  not	  inherently	  shameful	  but	  is,	  in	  fact,	  valorised;	   it	   was	   not	   that	   the	   essential	   nature	   of	   the	   body	   itself	   defined	   his	  (in)capacity	   to	   represent	   the	   people,	   but	  what	   he	   did	  with	   it.	   Clinton	   could	   never	  have	   been	   a	   ‘slut’	   or	   a	   ‘whore’	   (derogatory	   epithets	   that	   are	   qualitatively	  inapplicable	   to	   heterosexual	   men	   in	   Western	   culture),	   but	   he	   was	   a	   man	   who	  disgraced	  himself	  through	  sexual	  licentiousness.	  The	  press	  pointedly	  drew	  attention	  to	  Clinton’s	  capacious	   ‘appetites’	  and	  his	   ‘powerful	  and	  often	  successful	  urge	   to	  be	  all	  things	  to	  all	  people’.22	  Clinton	  was	  characterised	  as	  ‘the	  man	  who	  can	  eat	  an	  apple	  in	  one	  bite’.23	  Voters	  described	  him	  as	  a	  ‘bad	  boy’	  and	  a	  ‘rogue’,	  language	  that	  carries	  the	  connotation	  of	  the	  charming	  ladies’	  man.24	  One	  columnist	  expressed	  pity	  for	  the	  ‘likable	  and	  boyish	  President’,	  while	  another	  suggested	  that	  voters	  perceived	  Clinton	  as	  the	  ‘embattled	  underdog’	  whose	  history	  of	  philandering	  was	  no	  public	  secret.25	  It	  was	   Clinton’s	   very	   expansiveness	   and	   ability	   to	   command	   respect—not	   his	   sex—that	  served	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  his	  disgrace.	  In	  effect,	  Clinton	  was	  a	  great	  man	  with	  desires	  to	  match.	  Certainly	  he	  was	  disgraced	  by	  them,	  but	  whether	  he	  was	  shamed	  is	  a	  different	  matter.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Clinton	  represents	  the	  disgrace	  of	  a	  ‘red-­‐faced	  lech	  who	  can’t	  keep	   it	   zipped’,	   but	   on	   the	   other,	   he	   is	   also	   the	   embodiment	   of	   a	   culturally	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sanctioned	  understanding	  of	  masculine	  virility	  which	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	   penis	   to	   wander,	   often	   where	   it	   shouldn’t!26	   His	   heterosexuality	   protected	   him	  from	   fully	   inhabiting	   the	   shameful	   body	   of	   the	   other—he	   was	   never	   completely	  abjected.	   Rather,	   the	   shame	  was	   referred,	   experienced	   as	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   public	  body	  and	  a	  blot	  on	  the	  American	  presidency.	  As	  one	  letter-­‐writer	  put	  it,	  ‘Clinton	  is	  a	  disgrace	  to	  the	  office;	  he	  should	  not	  be	  a	  representative	  of	  our	  country.	  I’m	  ashamed	  to	   say	   he	   is	   our	   president.’27	   In	   other	   words,	   Clinton	   ‘fucked’	   the	   people	  metaphorically	   with	   his	   sexual	   disgrace—those	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Clinton	   camp	   saw	  themselves	   carrying	   the	   President’s	   shame.	   For	   those	  who	  were	  more	   supportive,	  the	   scandal	  was	   a	   sign	   of	   his	   humanity	   and	   right	   to	   sexual	   privacy.	   Comedian	   Jay	  Leno	  suggested	  at	  the	  time	  that	  it	  may	  have	  even	  boosted	  Clinton’s	  ratings	  because	  of	  its	  humanising	  effect	  in	  making	  the	  President	  ‘look	  like	  one	  of	  the	  people’.28	  In	   fact,	   this	   is	   exactly	   what	   happened	   to	   Australia’s	   former	   prime	   minister,	  Kevin	   Rudd.	   In	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	   federal	   election	   in	   2007,	   the	   then	   Labor	   leader	  Rudd	  was	  discovered	  to	  have	  visited	  a	  New	  York	  strip	  club	  while	  opposition	  Foreign	  Affairs	  spokesman.	  The	  incident—in	  the	  tradition	  of	  attaching	  the	  ‘gate’	  suffix	  to	  all	  disgraceful	   political	   incidents	   since	  Watergate—was	   to	   become	   jokingly	   known	   as	  ‘Strippergate’.	  It	  is	  well	  documented	  in	  the	  press	  that	  the	  public	  exposure	  of	  Rudd’s	  visit	  to	  a	  strip	  joint	  actually	  revitalised	  and	  improved	  his	  public	  image.	  Up	  until	  that	  point	   his	   persona	   had	   been	   perceived	   as	   overly	   austere	   and	   wholesome;	   the	  Australian	   public	   thus	   considered	   his	   indiscretion	   a	   humanising	   influence.	   In	   this	  sense,	  masculine	  disgrace	  (Strippergate)	  is	  experienced	  as	  a	  transitory	  slip	  in	  moral	  conduct,	   but	   feminine	   shame	   (being	   a	   slut)	   is	   embodied	   in	   the	   desiring	   vagina.	  Further,	   Rudd’s	   disgrace	   appears	   as	  merely	   a	   contagious	   effect	   of	   the	   real	   site	   of	  shame:	  the	  stripper’s	  exposed	  female	  body.	  In	   the	   breathless	   verbiage	   of	   the	   indomitable	   detective	   Monsieur	   Jackal,	  
cherchez	  la	  femme:	  ‘look	  for	  the	  woman’.	  The	  phrase	  alludes	  to	  an	  exceptionalism	  by	  which	  the	  inscrutable	  or	  uncharacteristic	  actions	  of	  honourable	  men	  may	  in	  the	  final	  analysis	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   irresistible	   allure	   of	   a	   woman.	   For	   both	   Clinton	   and	  Rudd,	   their	   disgrace	   was	   occasioned	   by	   Woman—or	   as	   Clinton	   declared,	   ‘that	  woman’—as	   the	   proper	   location	   of	   shame.	   As	   journalist	   Maureen	   Down	  wrote	   of	  Lewinsky	  and	  her	   infamous	  semen-­‐stained	  dress,	   ‘What	  kind	  of	  a	  girl	   saves	  such	  a	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trophy,	   much	   less	   sends	   it	   to	   her	   mother	   for	   safekeeping?’29	   What	   kind	   of	   girl	  indeed?	  These	  examples	  illustrate	  that	  the	  gendered	  contours	  of	  dishonour	  reveal	  that	  the	  source	  of	  a	  heterosexual	  man’s	  shame	  is	  a	  woman,	  while	  the	  source	  of	  a	  woman’s	  shame	   is	   her	   own	   body,	   its	   violability	   and	   secretiveness	   (for	   the	   penis	   is	   always	  already	   self-­‐evidently	   on	   display).	   To	   put	   it	   bluntly,	   naked	   male	   desire	   is	   not	  shameful,	  per	  se,	  most	  simply	  because	  in	  a	  sexist	  culture,	  it’s	  expected.	  Female	  desire,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	  more	   porous	   to	   shame.	  Male	   heterosexual	   desire	   enjoys	   the	  relative	   privacy	   of	   being	   a	   cultural	   given,	   but	   female	   desire	   is	   so	   laden	   with	  negativity	  and	  ambivalence	  that	  it	  feels	  the	  twist	  of	  shame	  to	  its	  core.	  The	  disgrace	  visited	   upon	   high	   profile	  men	   caught	   in	   brothels	   or	   strip	   clubs	   (with	   their	   ‘pants	  down’,	   as	   it	   were)	   passes	   and	   is	   forgiven—or	   at	   the	   very	   least	   understood	   as	  naturally	  belonging	  to	  the	  virile	  male	  body—as	  the	  headlines	  fade	  from	  view,	  but	  the	  shame	  of	   sex	  work,	   for	   example,	   perseveres	   in	   the	   irredeemable	   personage	   of	   the	  ‘whore’	  and	  her	  brazenly	  unconcealed	  genitals.	  
—FEMININITY AND EMBODIED SHAME I	  suggest	   that	   the	   feminised,	  or	  gendered,	  condition	  of	  shame	   lies	   in	   the	  being	  of	  a	  body	   for-­‐the-­‐other.	   I	   turn	   to	   Thomas	   Fuchs’s	   ‘corporealized	   body’	   as	   crucial	   to	  establish	  the	  distinction	  I	  wish	  to	  draw	  between	  the	  bodily	  materiality	  of	   feminine	  shame	  and	   the	   abstract	   disembodiment	   of	  masculine	  disgrace.30	   For	   Fuchs,	   shame	  arises	  when	  the	  prereflective	  continuity	  of	  the	  lived	  body—the	  imminent	  body	  that	  one	  lives	  through	  but	  does	  not	  think	  about—is	  broken	  by	  the	  unbidden	  appearance	  of	   the	   corporeal,	   self-­‐aware	  body.	  Drawing	   from	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  Fuchs	  argues	   that	  the	   experience	   of	   shame	   calls	   forth	   a	   ‘body-­‐for-­‐others’,	   in	   which	   one	   is	   made	   to	  recognise	   one’s	   own	   body	   as	   an	   object	   for	   the	   other.31	   One	   views	   one’s	   body	   as	  though	   from	   the	   outside	   looking	   in.	   Fuchs	   makes	   an	   arresting	   and	   necessary	  intervention	  into	  the	  prior	  discussion	  on	  shame:	  shame	  is	  not	  only	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  emotion,	  it	  is	  also	  body-­‐conscious.	  There	  is	  a	  bodiliness	  of	  the	  self-­‐as-­‐other	  that	  one	  is	   made	   to	   feel	   in	   shame,	   which	   interposes	   upon	   the	   lived	   body.	   The	   jolt	   of	  corporealisation	  that	  shame	  induces	  replaces	  my	  body	  as	  a	  ‘field	  of	  expression’	  with	  a	   ‘foreign	   body’	   crudely	   objectified,	   sapped	   of	   its	   internal	   life	   and	   divested	   of	  transcendent	   possibility.32	  When,	   in	   shame,	   the	   life	   of	   the	   prereflective	   lived-­‐body	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comes	   up	   against	   the	   intransigent,	   corporealised	   body-­‐for-­‐others,	   this	   violent	  discomfiture	  is	  revealed	  in	  expression,	  gesture	  and	  physiological	  change.	  In	  shame,	  the	  body	  forces	  an	  awareness	  in	  us	  of	  its	  presence:	  we	  may	  turn	  our	  eyes	  downward	  to	   avoid	   the	   searing	   look	  of	   contempt,	   or	   cover	   the	   face	  with	  our	  hands,	   avert	   the	  head	  or	  the	  body;	  we	  may	  hunch	  our	  shoulders,	  to	  make	  the	  body	  seem	  smaller,	  to	  shrink	  from	  the	  other’s	  gaze;	  and	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  notice	  the	  hot	  flush	  of	  colour	  on	  our	  cheeks,	  the	  sudden	  clamminess	  of	  hands,	  the	  race	  of	  heartbeat	  in	  the	  moment	  of	   shameful	   discovery.	   The	   intense	   awareness	   of	   embodiment	   in	   shame	   ‘turns	  my	  hidden	   centrality	   inside	   out’	   and	   alienates	  my	   body	   from	  myself.33	   It	   performs	   an	  incredible	   feat	  of	  Cartesian	  proportions	  at	   the	  same	   time	  as	   it	  places	   the	  self	  most	  trenchantly	  within	   a	   body	   that	  wants	   nothing	  more	   than	   to	   disappear	   from	   view.	  The	   pain	   of	   shame	   as	   the	   ‘incorporated	   gaze	   of	   the	   other’	   is	   explained	   through	   a	  jarring,	   abject	   positionality	   of	   ‘this	   is	   me-­‐this	   is	   not	   me’;	   the	   ‘ashamed	   person	  
doubles	  by	  perceiving	  herself	  from	  the	  outside’.34	  Fuchs’s	  concept	  of	   ‘corporealisation’	  has	  significant	   implications	  for	  a	  feminist	  or	   gendered	   reading	   of	   shame—such	   as	   is	   pertinent	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	  feminine	  shame	  and	  masculine	  disgrace—not	  least	  because	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir	  had	  already	  explored	  this	  very	  conflict	   (between	  the	   lived	  and	  the	  corporealised	  body)	  as	   the	   generalised	   condition	   of	   female	   existence.	   Beauvoir	   could	   well	   have	   been	  talking	   about	   Fuchs’s	   state	   of	   shame	   when	   she	   elaborates	   upon	   the	   painful,	  wrenching	  subjectivity	  of	  woman,	  imprisoned	  in	  an	  animal	  body	  that	  is	  nonetheless	  endowed	   with	   a	   capacity	   to	   extend	   itself	   existentially.	   It	   is	   the	   inessential,	  objectified,	   or	   ‘corporealised’,	   body	   that	   explains	   the	   problem	   of	   woman’s	  paradoxical	   (in)existence,	   in	   which	   she	   ‘assumes	   herself	   as	   both	   self	   and	   other’.35	  This	   theme	   has	   also	   been	   taken	   up	   by	   Iris	   Marion	   Young	   in	   her	   influential	   essay	  ‘Throwing	   like	   a	   Girl’,	   in	   which	   she	   argues	   that	   the	   modality	   of	   feminine	   bodily	  experience	  is	  structured	  by	  a	  paralysing	  conflict	  between	  the	  transcendental	  activity	  that	   characterises	   the	   lived	   body	   and	   the	   frustrated	   potentiality	   of	   a	   body	   drawn	  into	  itself	  in	  immanence.	  The	  central	  feature	  of	  this	  ‘ambiguous	  transcendence’	  is	  the	  curtailment	   of	   possibilities	   in	   the	   world	   achievable	   by	   uninhibited	   intentionality	  expressed	  through	  directed	  and	  coordinated	  action.36	  This	  establishes	  an	  ambiguity	  about	  what	  the	  female	  subject	  can	  and	  cannot	  achieve,	  for	  in	  bodily	  existence	  ‘an	  “I	  cannot”	  may	  appear	   to	   set	   limits	   to	   the	   “I	   can”	  …	  By	   repressing	  or	  withholding	   its	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own	  motile	  energy,	  feminine	  bodily	  existence	  frequently	  projects	  an	  “I	  can”	  and	  an	  “I	  cannot”	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  very	  same	  end’.37	  	  If	   the	   condition	   of	   shame	  outlined	  by	   Fuchs	   can	  be	   generalisable	   to	   the	   basic	  condition	  of	   feminine	  embodiment,	  as	  theorised	  by	  de	  Beauvoir	  and	  Young,	   then	  it	  provides	   a	   compelling	   explanation	   for	   Sandra	   Bartky’s	   postulate	   that	   women	   are	  ‘more	   prone’	   to	   experiencing	   feelings	   of	   shame	   than	   men.38	   Bartky	   observes	   in	  women	   ‘a	   pervasive	   sense	   of	   personal	   inadequacy	   that,	   like	   the	   shame	   of	  embodiment,	   is	  profoundly	  disempowering;	  both	  reveal	   the	  “generalized	  condition	  of	   dishonour”	   which	   is	   women’s	   lot	   in	   sexist	   society’.39	   I	   would,	   however,	   modify	  Bartky’s	   assumption	   of	   an	   analogous	   relationship	   between	   subjective	   personal	  inadequacy	  and	  the	  shame	  of	  embodiment,	  given	  the	  phenomenological	  arguments	  provided	   by	   de	   Beauvoir	   and	   Young.	   If	   we	   accept	   their	   thesis	   that	   the	   body	   is	  fundamental	   to	   subjective	   experience	   then,	   logically,	   the	   shame	   of	   personal	  inadequacy	   described	   by	   Bartky	   cannot	   be	   disentangled	   from	   the	   shame	   of	  embodiment,	   for	   the	   subjective	   self	   is	   fundamentally	   embodied—that	   is,	  experienced	   and	   constituted	   through	   the	   lived	   body.	   To	   elaborate	   further,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  ‘shame’	  as	  the	  emotional	  materialisation	  of	  the	  crippling	  effects	  visited	  upon	  female	  subjective	  transcendental	   intentionality	  by	  the	  production	  of	  a	  body	  that	  is	  both	  mine	  and	  not-­‐mine.	  	  However,	  can	   it	   really	  be	  asserted	  that	  all	  women	   in	  sexist	  society	  experience	  their	   embodied	   existence	   so	   homogeneously?	   For	   instance,	   Bartky	   contrasts	   the	  learning	  behaviours	  of	  her	   female	  and	  male	  university	   students	   to	  make	  her	  point	  about	  female	  shame-­‐proneness.	  Certainly,	  the	  female	  university	  student	  population	  is	   perhaps	   not	   a	   particularly	   representative	   cohort	   to	   be	   basing	   a	   generalisable	  theory	  of	   femininity	  upon,	   and	  one	   could	  question	   the	  motivations	  and	  wisdom	  of	  trying	  to	  pose	  a	  generalisable	  theory	  at	  all.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  said	  that	  for	  working-­‐class	  women,	  it	  is	  the	  shame	  of	  being	  unrespectable	  that	  is	  the	  greater	  concern,	  and	  which	  inflects	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	  embody	  their	   femininity.40	  The	  same	  can	  equally	  be	  said	  about	  race,	  sexuality	  and	  ability.	  However,	  I	  would	  attend	  to	  such	  concerns	  by	  saying	   that	   the	   long-­‐held	   association	   of	   the	   female	   reproductive	   body	   with	   pre-­‐human	   animality	   or	   sexuality	   is	   complicated,	   certainly,	   but	  not	   erased	   through	   its	  semiotic	   doubling	   in	   the	   bodies	   of	   working-­‐class	   women	   and	   women	   of	   colour.	   I	  argue	   that	   sexual	   difference	   is	   a,	   but	   not	   the	   only	   or	   preternatural,	   central	   lens	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through	   which	   we	   can	   view	   the	   distance	   between	   shame	   and	   disgrace.	   I	   suggest,	  given	   the	   historical	   connection	   between	   femininity	   and	   the	   body,	   that	   the	   female	  body	   is	   closer	   to	   the	   corporealising	   effects	   of	   shame	   than	   the	  male	  body,	  which	   is	  more	  prone	  to	  experiencing	  disgrace.	  
—EMBODIED SHAME IN J.M. COETZEE’S DISGRACE Shame	   is	   an	   emotion	   with	   a	   peculiar	   textual	   energy	   that	   shares	   a	   certain	  importunate	   intimacy	  with	   the	   female	  body,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  disfiguring	  work	  of	  public	  disgrace.	  The	  narrative	  power	  of	  the	  gendering	  of	  disgrace	  and	  shame	  has	  a	  striking	   presence	   in	   J.M.	   Coetzee’s	   novel	  Disgrace.	   A	   deconstructive	   reading	   of	   the	  text	  is	  able	  to	  show	  that	  the	  book	  cannot	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  conflating	  shame	  and	  disgrace	  when	   the	   gendered	   plot	   that	   underpins	   it	   performs	   the	   opposite.	   In	   this	  regard,	   I	   take	   issue	   with	   Kossew’s	   contention	   that	   Disgrace	   is	   centrally	   about	   a	  tension	   between	   the	   publicity	   of	   shame/disgrace	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   its	  negotiation	   through	   the	   ethical	   choices	   of	   the	   everyday.41	   This	   reading	   enables	  Kossew	  to	  position	  ‘public	  disgrace	  or	  shame’	  against	  ‘the	  idea	  of	  individual	  grace	  or	  salvation’.42	  Such	  a	  reading	  is	  problematic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  fails	  to	  consider	  that	   the	   promise	   of	   salvation	   may	   already	   be	   a	   property	   of	   disgrace;	   second,	   by	  producing	   shame	   and	   disgrace	   as	   tautological	   it	   ignores	   the	   analogic	   relation	  between	   them	   that	   is	   clearly	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   contrast	   between	   Lucy’s	   secret	  shame	  (her	  rape)	  and	  her	  father’s	  public	  disgrace	  (his	  sexual	  harassment	  of	  a	  female	  student).	  I	  argue,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  that	  the	  central	  opposition	  organising	  the	  book	  is	  not	  between	  public	  and	  private,	  but	  embodied	  shame	  and	  facialised	  disgrace.	  The	  novel	   is	  set	   in	  post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa,	  but	   the	  way	   in	  which	  disgrace	  and	   shame	   interweave	   in	   the	   book	   reveal	   a	   plot	   that	   is	   ostensibly	   an	   allegory	   for	  race	   relations,	   narrativised	   through	   gender.	   As	   Sedgwick	   has	   demonstrated	   in	   her	  analysis	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	  rape	  employed	  in	  Gone	  with	  the	  Wind,	  a	  narrative	  focus	  on	   sexuality	   can	  work	   to	  obscure	  or	   conceal	   other	   ‘symbolic	   fractures’	   in	   the	   text,	  such	  as	  race	  and	  class	  relations.43	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Disgrace,	  it	  is	  the	  reverse:	  the	  central	  thematic	  concern	  about	  race	  relations	  and	  post-­‐apartheid	  reparation	  makes	  oblique	  the	   ‘differentials	   of	   power’	   in	   gender	   upon	   which	   the	   text	   relies	   for	   its	   ethical	  teleology.44	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  rape	  discourse	  in	  Disgrace	  is	  extremely	  problematic,	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but	  it	  is	  precisely	  through	  this	  discourse,	  I	  argue,	  that	  embodied	  shame	  in	  the	  novel	  is	  materialised	  as	  feminine.	  The	  protagonist,	  David	  Lurie,	   is	  a	  white	  university	  professor,	  expert	  on	  Byron,	  ageing	  cynic	  and	  a	  serial	  seducer	  of	  women,	   in	  an	  academic	   job	  he	  no	  longer	  cares	  for	  within	  an	   ‘emasculated	  institution	  of	   learning’.45	  By	  page	  four,	   the	   institution	  is	  already	   allied	  with	   phallic	   feminists	   and	   castration	   anxiety,	   foreshadowing	   Lurie’s	  impending	   struggle	   to	   claim	  his	  manhood	  against	  bureaucratic	  demands	   that	   it	   be	  renounced.	  The	   theme	  of	  white	  male	   emasculation	   resonates	  with	   the	   attempts	   at	  land	  redistribution	  by	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC)	  and	  the	  land	  seizures	  by	  Mugabe.	  There	  are	  three	  central	  narrative	  arcs	  that	  punctuate	  the	  plot	  of	  Disgrace:	  David	  Lurie’s	  disgrace	  as	  a	  man	  accused	  of	   sexual	  harassment;	  his	  white	  daughter	  Lucy’s	   rape	   by	   black	   men	   who	   also	   disfigure	   Lurie	   by	   setting	   him	   alight;	   Lucy’s	  decision	  to	  keep	  the	  baby	  conceived	  through	  rape	  coupled	  with	  Lurie’s	  redemption	  through	  becoming	  the	  ‘dog-­‐man’.	  Shame	  is	  glaringly	  present	   in	  Disgrace,	   insinuating	  itself	   into	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  women,	  with	   (Lurie’s)	   disgrace	   as	   its	   adjacent	   complement.	   Shame	  makes	   its	   first	  appearance	  in	  Melanie	  Isaacs,	  the	  student	  with	  whom	  Lurie	  will	  have	  an	  affair.	  Lurie	  invites	   her	   into	   his	   home:	   ‘He	   stares,	   frankly	   ravished.	   She	   lowers	   her	   eyes’,	   and	  leaves.46	  When	  they	  have	  sex	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  she	  averts	  her	  face;	  when	  next	  they	  meet,	  in	  the	  pouring	  rain,	  ‘her	  face	  is	  flushed’;	  in	  class,	  she	  avoids	  his	  gaze—’her	  eyes	  meet	  his	  and	  in	  a	  flash	  see	  all.	  Confused,	  she	  drops	  her	  glance’;	  and	  in	  the	  final,	  not	  to	  mention	  disturbing,	  sex	  scene,	  ‘all	  she	  does	  is	  avert	  herself:	  avert	  her	  lips,	  avert	  her	  eyes’.47	   Shame	   first	   makes	   itself	   known	   in	   Melanie’s	   body,	   reaching	   a	   disquieting	  intensity	  in	  the	  final	  sex	  scene,	  disturbing	  because	  it	  obliquely	  presents	  itself	  as	  the	  scene	  of	  rape:	  She	  does	  not	  resist.	  All	   she	  does	   is	  avert	  herself:	   avert	  her	   lips,	  avert	  her	  eyes.	  She	  lets	  him	  lay	  her	  out	  on	  the	  bed	  and	  undress	  her:	  she	  even	  helps	  him,	  raising	  her	  arms	  and	  then	  her	  hips.	  Little	  shivers	  of	  cold	  run	  through	  her;	  as	  soon	  as	  she	  is	  bare,	  she	  slips	  under	  the	  quilted	  counterpane	  like	  a	  mole	  burrowing,	  and	  turns	  her	  back	  on	  him.	  Not	   rape,	   not	   quite	   that,	   but	   undesired	   nonetheless,	   undesired	   to	   the	  core.	   As	   though	   she	   had	   decided	   to	   go	   slack,	   die	   within	   herself	   for	   the	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duration,	   like	  a	   rabbit	  when	   the	   jaws	  of	   the	   fox	  close	  on	   its	  neck.	  So	   that	  everything	  done	  to	  her	  might	  be	  done,	  as	  it	  were,	  far	  away.48	  There	   is	  no	  doubt,	   to	  my	  mind,	   that	  Lurie’s	  negation—’not	   rape’—is	   the	  adjectival	  phrase	   that	   removes	   the	   ambiguity	   of	   a	   passage	   which	   cannot	   now	   be	   describing	  anything	  other	  than	  rape.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  its	  correlate—’not	  quite	  that’—alters	  the	  definitive	  meaning	  of	   ‘not’	   through	  the	  addition	  of	   the	  adverb	   ‘quite’,	   softening	  the	  tone	   and	   introducing	   doubt.	   By	   the	   close	   of	   the	   passage,	   one	   is	   left	   to	   wonder	  whether	  the	  word	  ‘no’	  has	  any	  valency	  at	  all	  outside	  David	  Lurie’s	  appropriation	  of	  it.	   This	   culmination	   of	   Lurie’s	   flirtation	   with	   Melanie	   instantiates	   the	   gendered	  narrative	  structure	  of	   the	  book	  by	  establishing	  an	   irrevocable	  connection	  between	  rape,	  shame	  and	  the	  female	  body,	  and	  the	  masculine	  correlate	  of	  desire	  and	  disgrace.	  After	   the	   seduction	   of	   Melanie,	   Lurie	   is	   hauled	   before	   a	   disciplinary	   panel,	  which	  tries	  to	  elicit	  from	  him	  a	  confession	  of	  moral	  guilt.	  Lurie	  refuses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   protecting	   his	   private	   honour,	   arguing	   for	   a	   difference	   between	   a	   public	  admission	   of	   guilt	   and	   a	   confession	   of	   deep	   moral	   weakness:	   ‘It	   reminds	   me	   too	  much	   of	  Mao’s	   China,’	   he	   says	   to	   Lucy.	   ‘Recantation,	   self-­‐criticism,	   public	   apology.	  I’m	  old-­‐fashioned,	  I	  would	  prefer	  simply	  to	  be	  put	  against	  a	  wall	  and	  shot.	  Have	  done	  with	  it.’49	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  blame	  this	  situation	  on	  a	  puritanical	  and	  castrating	  culture,	  with	   a	   refusal	   that	   evokes	   Derrida’s	   criticism	   of	   the	   paradox	   of	   freedom	   of	  expression	  evident	  in	  democracy,	  which	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  right	  of	  reply,	  though	  it	   commands	   that	   one	  must.50	   The	   subjective	   responsibility	   of	   democracy,	   then,	   is	  that	   the	   subject	   is	   obligated	   to	   provide	   an	   answer.	   Perhaps	   Lurie	   is	   resisting	   this	  compulsion	  by	  saying	  yes	  (I	  am	  guilty)	  and	  no	  (I	  am	  not	  morally	  culpable):	  ‘Freedom	  of	  speech.	  Freedom	  to	  remain	  silent.’51	  	  More	   than	   one	   literary	   critic	   has	  made	   note	   of	   the	   problematic	   gendering	   of	  silence	  in	  Coetzee’s	  narrative.	  After	  her	  rape,	  Lucy	  refuses	  to	  bend	  to	  Lurie’s	  coaxing	  to	   tell	   ‘the	  whole	   story’,	   deciding	   to	   keep	   on	   living	   in	   the	   place	  where	   the	   trauma	  happened,	   and	   resolutely	   claiming	  her	  pain	  as	  her	  own,	   in	  marked	  contrast	   to	  her	  father’s	   sensational	   disgrace	   as	   a	   man	   whom	   she	   ironically	   dubs	   ‘mad,	   bad,	   and	  dangerous	  to	  know’.52	  Lucy	  responds	  sharply	  to	  her	  father’s	  pleas	  to	  give	  the	  police	  a	  full	  account	  of	  her	  ordeal:	  	  This	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  you,	  David.	  You	  want	  to	  know	  why	  I	  have	  not	  laid	  a	  particular	  charge	  with	  the	  police.	  I	  will	  tell	  you,	  as	  long	  as	  you	  agree	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not	  to	  raise	  the	  subject	  again.	  The	  reason	  is	  that,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  concerned,	  what	   happened	   to	   me	   is	   a	   purely	   private	   matter.	   In	   another	   time,	   in	  another	  place	   it	  might	  be	  held	   to	  be	  a	  public	  matter.	  But	   in	   this	  place,	   at	  this	  time,	  it	  is	  not.	  It	  is	  my	  business,	  mine	  alone.53	  	  Lucy	  explains	  that	  her	  reasoning	  is	  a	  refusal	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  salvation	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  painful	   labour	   of	   everyday	   living	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   trauma.	   Both	   Lucy	   and	   her	  father’s	   refusals	   to	   speak	   to	   the	   police	   and	   the	   university	   committee	   is	   also	  suggestive	  of	  a	   failure	  of	   institutions	  to	  effect	  symbolic	  reparation.	  Elleke	  Boehmer	  understands	   Lucy’s	   gesture	   as	   a	   resigned	   acceptance	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   historical	  violence	  through	  the	  body.	  Hence,	  according	  to	  Boehmer,	  ‘Lucy,	  far	  more	  than	  Lurie,	  becomes	   the	   human	   body-­‐in-­‐pain	   of	   the	   text	   …	   As	   a	   body	   she	   is	   the	   non-­‐introspective	  arbiter	  of	  what	   it	   is	   to	   live	   the	   truth	  of	   the	  new	  South	  Africa.	  Even	   if	  willingly	   or	   unwittingly,	   she	   stages,	   with	   her	   sorriness,	   her	   pitifulness,	   an	  apologia.’54	  Paul	  Newman	  notes	  that	  the	  white	  male	  voice	  is	  privileged	  in	  Coetzee’s	  narrative	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	  Other’s	   silence,	   a	   problem	  of	   vocality	  which	   is	   not	  necessarily	   addressed	   by	   the	   ‘valorised	   politics	   of	   not	   “speaking	   for”	   the	   Other’.55	  Both	  Lucy	  and	  Lurie,	  in	  their	  different	  ways,	  stage	  an	  apology	  without	  words,	  figured	  in	   the	  novel	   as	   the	  work	  of	   shame	  and	  disgrace—Lucy	   through	  her	   violated	  body,	  and	  Lurie	  through	  taking	  up	  an	  identification	  with	  the	  unwanted,	  uncared-­‐for	  dogs	  he	   euthanases	   at	   Bev	   Shaw’s	   clinic.	   The	   institutional	   requirement	   of	   confession	  could	  be	  read	  as	  having	  been	  substituted	  by	  Lucy’s	  and	  Lurie’s	   lived	  experience	  of	  shame	   and	   disgrace	   as	   de	   facto	   forms	   of	   apology.	   As	   Sartre	   writes	   in	   Being	   and	  
Nothingness,	   ‘My	  shame	  is	  a	  confession’;	  that	  is,	  my	  shame	  is	  a	  confession	  of	  what	  I	  am,	  which	   is	   a	   being	   for	   the	   other.56	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   Lurie	   never	   publicly	  confesses	   because	   he	   imagines	   his	   shame	   speaks	   his	   silence.	   But	   one	   might	   give	  pause	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lurie	  is	  actually	  ashamed.	  Beneath	  his	  dissent	  lies	  the	   deeply	   problematic	   conviction	   that	   he	   hasn’t	   done	   anything	   wrong	   and	   the	  equally	   problematic	   narrative	   defence	   of	   what	   should	   really	   be	   an	   indefensible	  crime.	  Yet	  because	  his	  crime	  of	  rape	  is	  hidden	  by	  ambiguity	  and	  negation,	  it	  ceases	  even	  to	  be	  a	  crime.	  In	  effect,	  his	  right	  to	  remain	  silent,	  his	  right	  to	  reject	  confession,	  is	  only	  made	  possible	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  Melanie’s	  sacrificial	  silence	  engendered	  by	  shame.	  It	  is	  through	  Melanie’s	  shame	  that	  Lurie	  can	  claim	  his	  humanity,	  as	  is	  made	  clear	   to	   him	   by	   a	  member	   of	   the	   university	   disciplinary	   panel:	   ‘You	  may	   find	   this	  
Camille Nurka—Feminine Shame/Masculine Disgrace	   325 
hard	  to	  believe,	  David,	  but	  we	  around	  this	  table	  are	  not	  your	  enemies.	  We	  have	  our	  weak	  moments,	  all	  of	  us,	  we	  are	  only	  human.’57	  Disgrace	  affords	  the	  opportunity	  of	  redemption,	  as	  Lucy	  attests	  when	  she	  tells	  her	  father	  that	  he	  has	  ‘paid’	  his	  ‘price’.58	  There	   is	   the	   sense	   here	   that	   to	   suffer	   disgrace	   is	   in	   itself	   to	   be	   redeemed,	   that	  disgrace	  presupposes	  a	  phoenix-­‐like	  humanity,	  which	  rises	  from	  its	  own	  ashes.	  	  Not	   only	   has	   Lurie’s	   original	   crime	   (rape)	   become	   euphemised	   as	   ‘sexual	  harassment’	   (‘not	   quite’	   rape),	   but	   the	   violence	   of	   it	   remains	   unavowed	   for	   two	  reasons:	   first,	   because	   the	   shame	   of	   rape	   is	   projected	   onto	   Melanie	   (and	   her	  narrative	   double,	   Lucy),	   and	   second	   because	   the	   rape	   of	   his	   daughter	   Lucy	   is	   so	  horrifying	   and	   unambiguously	   violent	   that	   the	   white	   man’s	   crime	   undergoes	   a	  double	  erasure	   through	   the	  projection	  of	   criminality	  onto	   the	  black	   rapist.	  Rape	   is	  imagined	  in	  the	  book	  in	  terms	  of	  degrees	  of	  harm:	  Melanie	  is	  merely	  undesirous	  and	  Lucy	   is	   brutally	   violated.	   ‘Raping	   a	   lesbian	  worse	   than	   raping	   a	   virgin:	  more	   of	   a	  blow’,	   Lurie	  muses	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   his	   lesbian	  daughter’s	   rape,	   in	  what	   appears	   as	  another	  veiled	  comparison—was	  Melanie	  a	  virgin?59	  The	  scene	  of	  Lucy’s	  rape	  is	  vastly	  different.	  Though	  we	  do	  not	  witness	  it—it	  is	  Lucy’s	  dark	   secret	   to	  which	  neither	  we	  nor	  Lurie	  have	  access—we	  know	   that	   it	   is	  violent	  and	  hate-­‐filled:	  she	  is	  pack-­‐raped	  by	  a	  gang	  of	  three	  young	  black	  men	  while	  Lurie	  is	  powerless	  to	  save	  her,	  helpless	  and	  emasculated,	  having	  been	  set	  alight	  and	  locked	   in	   the	   toilet	  by	   the	   intruders.	  Lurie	   is	  disfigured	   in	   the	  process;	  he	   loses	  an	  ear.	   The	   disfigurement	   implied	   in	   ‘disgrace’	   is	   literalised	   through	   Lurie’s	   burned	  flesh	   and	   missing	   ear.	   His	   fate	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Edward	   Rochester’s	   sacrificial	  immolation	   for	   his	   past	   sins	   and	   bigamist	   desires	   in	   Charlotte	   Brontë’s	   Jane	   Eyre.	  Rochester	  explains	  his	  sexual	  transgressions	  in	  the	  anxious	  language	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  contamination	  to	  white	  bourgeois	  purity:	  	  It	  was	  a	  grovelling	  fashion	  of	  existence:	  I	  should	  never	  like	  to	  return	  to	  it.	  Hiring	  a	  mistress	  is	  the	  next	  worst	  thing	  to	  buying	  a	  slave:	  both	  are	  often	  by	   nature,	   and	   always	   by	   position,	   inferior;	   and	   to	   live	   familiarly	   with	  inferiors	  is	  degrading.	  I	  now	  hate	  the	  recollection	  of	  the	  time	  I	  passed	  with	  Céline,	  Giacinta,	  and	  Clara.60	  Degradation	  is	  here	  explained	  as	  the	  contagious	  effects	  of	  class	  and	  race.	  Rochester’s	  disgrace—that	  is,	  his	  slide	  from	  a	  position	  of	  social	  privilege—is	  only	  occasioned	  by	  the	   people	   with	   whom	   he	   consorts,	   especially	   his	   reviled	   ‘Creole’	   wife	   Bertha,	   to	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whom	  he	  refers	  as	  his	   ‘disgusting	  secret’.	  The	  fire	  at	  Thornfield	  cleanses	  Rochester	  by	  removing	  the	  threat	  of	  contamination	  (Bertha	  dies)	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  left	  hand	  and	  eyesight	  become	  his	  redemption	  for	  his	  past	  erotic	  misdeeds.	  Though	  Rochester	  is	  physically	  damaged,	  he	  never	  loses	  his	  privileged	  social	  status;	  his	  disgrace	  passes	  because	   the	   damage	   he	   suffers	   to	   his	   body	   becomes	   his	   redemption.	   Rochester	  invokes	   the	   white	   bourgeois	   family	   as	   a	   sacred	   barrier	   against	   the	   external	  contaminants	  of	  blackness	  and	  working-­‐class	  femininity.	  In	  Disgrace,	  Lurie’s	  ‘disgusting	  secret’	  (the	  rape	  of	  Melanie)	  is	  deferred	  onto	  the	  body	  of	   the	  black	  man	  (the	  rape	  of	  Lucy)	  who	  then	  becomes	  the	  bearer	  of	  disgust.	  White	  femininity	   is	  the	  paradoxical	  boundary	  concept	  for	  racial	  contamination	  and	  reparation.	  Lucy’s	  decision	  to	  have	  the	  baby	  conceived	  from	  rape	  is	  symbolic	  of	  the	  selfless	  purity	  of	   the	  eternal	   feminine,	  which	  promises	  wholeness	   and	   completion.	  Lurie	   (the	   white	   man)	   is	   strangely	   distanced	   from	   the	   larger	   narrative	   of	   racial	  reconciliation	   and	   restitution.	   In	   reality,	   he	   gives	   up	   nothing.	   The	   obligation	   of	  reparation	  falls	  not	  to	  him	  but	  to	  the	  pregnant	  Lucy.	  The	  only	  attempt	  at	  atonement	  (for	  his	  own	  sins)	  that	  Lurie	  makes	  is	  with	  Melanie’s	   father—a	  contract	  of	  apology	  and	   forgiveness	   enacted	   between	  men	   in	   a	   homosocial	   structure	   of	   relations	   that	  excludes	  Melanie	  herself.	  The	  disfiguration	  of	  disgrace	  is,	  as	  I	  suggested	  earlier,	  both	  a	  moral	  punishment	  and	  its	  own	  reward.	  Lurie’s	  public	  disgrace	  is	  also	  his	  penance,	  but	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	   said	   for	   shame.	   While	   Disgrace	   attempts	   to	   produce	   an	   equivalence	   in	   value	  between	   ‘shame’	  and	   ‘disgrace’—the	  book	   is	  reliant	  upon	  this	  one	  central	  dualism:	  ‘Lucy’s	   secret;	   his	   disgrace’61—its	   narrative	   organisation	   of	   gender	   conflicts	   with	  such	  naive	  isomorphism.	  Lurie	  experiences	  his	  disgrace	  as	  the	  failure	  to	  control	  his	  rampant	  desire,	  yet	  he	  also	  positions	  that	  desire	  as	  the	  seat	  of	  his	  humanity.	  In	  one	  memorable	  passage,	  he	  explains	  his	  situation	  to	  Lucy	  through	  relating	  a	  story	  about	  a	  dog	  beaten	  by	  its	  owners	  for	  responding	  to	  its	  sexual	  instincts	  whenever	  a	  bitch	  on	  heat	  was	  near:	  There	  was	  something	  so	  ignoble	  in	  the	  spectacle	  that	  I	  despaired.	  One	  can	  punish	  a	  dog,	   it	  seems	  to	  me,	   for	  an	  offence	   like	  chewing	  a	  slipper.	  A	  dog	  will	  accept	  the	  justice	  of	  that:	  a	  beating	  for	  a	  chewing.	  But	  desire	  is	  another	  story.	  No	  animal	  will	  accept	  the	  justice	  of	  being	  punished	  for	  following	  its	  instincts	  …	  What	  was	  ignoble	  about	  the	  Kenilworth	  spectacle	  was	  that	  the	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poor	   dog	   had	   begun	   to	   hate	   its	   own	   nature.	   It	   no	   longer	   needed	   to	   be	  beaten.	   It	   was	   ready	   to	   punish	   itself.	   At	   that	   point	   it	   would	   have	   been	  better	  to	  shoot	  it.62	  Although	  Lurie	  identifies	  with	  the	  shamed	  dog,	  he’s	  not	  actually	  dishonoured	  in	  the	  same	  way	  his	  daughter	   is;	   rather,	  his	  disgrace	  allows	  him	  to	  assume	  his	  humanity,	  however	  flawed	  or	  immoral	  it	  may	  appear	  to	  others.	  He	  retains	  trust	  in	  his	  desire	  as	  that	  which	   fundamentally	  makes	  him	  who	  he	   is,	   and	  which	  underpins	  his	   claim	   to	  have	  been	  ‘enriched’	  by	  his	  string	  of	  sexual	  conquests.63	  His	  sexual	  liaison	  with	  ugly	  Bev	  Shaw	  (‘poor	  Bev	  Shaw’,	  loyal	  caretaker	  of	  the	  doomed	  dogs)	  appears	  as	  penance	  for	  his	  past	  misdeeds	  with	  better-­‐looking	  women;	   indeed,	  his	  disgust	   for	  Bev	   is	  so	  pronounced	  as	   to	   suggest	   that	  he	   considers	  himself	  more	  debased	   through	  having	  sex	  with	   her	   than	   by	   his	   rape	   of	  Melanie.	   ‘After	   the	   sweet	   young	   flesh	   of	  Melanie	  Isaacs,	   this	   is	  what	   I	  have	  come	  to.	  This	   is	  what	   I	  will	  have	  to	  get	  used	  to,	   this	  and	  even	  less	  than	  this.’64	  Bev	  blushes	  at	  his	  attentions,	  presumably	  a	  sign	  of	  shame	  for	  her	  sexual	  arousal.	  Through	   ‘giving	  up’	   the	  dogs	   and	   giving	  up	  his	   desire	   (by	   fucking	  Bev	   Shaw),	  Lurie	  learns	  to	  love,	  but	  how	  far	  can	  that	  love	  extend	  when	  his	  own	  sexual	  violence	  remains	   unacknowledged	   by	   him?	   We	   do	   not	   know	   what	   or	   whom	   Melanie	   or	  Soraya	  love—they	  are	  the	  ciphers	  for	  Lurie’s	  own	  torturous	  love	  affair	  with	  himself.	  As	  Newman	  points	  out,	  ‘the	  focus	  on	  David	  Lurie’s	  “ethical”	  suffering’	  prompts	  us	  to	  question	  Coetzee’s	  privileging	  of	   ‘the	  plight	  of	  white	  masculinity	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  the	  material	  suffering	  of	  women’.65	   If	  Lurie	  does	  suffer	  perpetrator	  shame,	   it	   is	  not	  because	   he	   empathically	   puts	   himself	   in	  Melanie’s	   place.	   Rather,	   Lurie	   carries	   his	  disgrace	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  dog.	  Being	  publicly	  disgraced	  for	  unwieldy	  passions	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  living	  shame	  materially,	  in	  and	  through	  the	  body-­‐for-­‐the-­‐other.	  This	  is,	  I	  would	   argue,	   the	   primary	   problem	   in	   the	   text	   as	   one	   that	   narrates	   a	   tale	   of	   racial	  reconciliation	  through	  an	  all	  too	  familiar	  Cartesian	  plot.	  As	  Newman	  argues,	  Lurie’s	  white	  masculine	   agency	   is	   problematically	   staged	   through	   the	   female	   body	   as	   the	  figurative	  ground	  of	  its	  possibility.66	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  body-­‐doubles	  everywhere.	  The	  women—Soraya,	  Melanie,	  Lucy,	  Bev—are	  the	  conduits	  for	  man’s	  humanity	  and	  the	  source	  of	  both	  his	  disgrace	  and	  redemption:	  Lucy	  fulfils	  the	  dream	  of	  reparation	  in	  giving	   birth	   to	   a	   child	   of	   rape;	   Melanie	   forces	   Lurie’s	   self-­‐analysis	   by	   being	   the	  impetus	  for	  his	  disgrace;	  Bev	  and	  the	  dogs	  are	  the	  vehicles	  for	  his	  salvation	  through	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degradation;	  Soraya	  has	  a	  material	  existence	  only	  as	  a	  figment	  of	  Lurie’s	  desire.	  The	  bodies	   of	   others—dogs	   and	   women—carry	   the	   bodily	   burden	   of	   the	   white	   man’s	  shame.	   Boehmer	   explains	   that	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   Lurie’s	   animal	  identification	   takes	   place	   do	   not	   hold	   the	   same	   promise	   of	   redemption	   for	   the	  women	  in	  the	  story.	  As	  she	  suggests,	  while	  a	   ‘feminizing	  or	  animalizing	  atonement	  represents	   a	  meaningful	   recompense	   for	   a	  man’	   it	   is	  not	   so	   for	   a	  woman,	   ‘always-­‐already	  a	  creature	  of	  dumb	  animality’	  and	  for	  whom	  ‘it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  no	  change—a	  continuation	   of	   subjection	   which	   it	   would	   be	   preposterous	   to	   propose	   as	  redemptive’.67	  The	  female	  body,	  as	  Boehmer’s	  argument	  suggests,	   is	  not	  only	  already	  animal,	  but	   also	   already	   shamed	   precisely	   because	   of	   its	   animal	   nature.	   Lurie	   only	   comes	  into	  contact	  with	  shame	  second-­‐hand,	  through	  the	  animal	  bodies	  of	  others.	  The	  dog	  is	   a	  metaphor	   for	  his	  disgrace	  because	   it	   is	   not	   something	  he	   is	   able	   to	  materially	  embody,	  unlike	  his	  daughter’s	  visceral	  shame.	  As	  Boehmer	  writes	  of	  Lucy’s	  pain,	  ‘the	  suffering	   she	   thus	   resolves	   bodily	   to	   endure	   is	   her	   suffering,	   not	   another’s,	   not	   a	  dog’s’.68	  Shame	  is	  so	  inextricably	  wedded	  to	  the	  raped	  female	  body	  in	  this	  story	  that	  it	   is	  prevented	   from	  attaching	   to	  white	  bourgeois	  masculinity.	   In	   fact,	   the	  event	   in	  which	  Lurie	  is	  burned	  and	  loses	  an	  ear	  actually	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  his	  disgrace,	  which	  was	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  case.	  The	  marks	  on	  Lurie’s	  body	  are	  instead	  a	  contagious	  effect	  of	  Lucy’s	  shame.	  When	  Lucy	  refuses	  to	  go	  into	  town	  after	   the	   rape,	   Lurie	   surmises	   it	   is	   ‘[b]ecause	   of	   the	   disgrace.	   Because	   of	   the	  shame.’69	  But	  he	  is	  wrong	  on	  this	  count.	  His	  daughter	  is	  shamed,	  not	  disgraced	  and,	  semiotically,	   they	   don’t	   amount	   to	   the	   same	   thing.	   Unlike	   Lurie,	   who	   only	  experiences	   shame	   virally	   and	   second-­‐hand,	   Lucy	   carries	   shame	   in	   her	   body,	  specifically	   in	   her	   vagina	   and	   pregnant	   womb.	   The	   necessarily	   heterosexualised	  ‘family’,	   the	   imperative	   of	   generation,	   functions	   as	   the	   narrative’s	   salvational	  teleology.	  In	  both	  Jane	  Eyre	  and	  Disgrace,	  social	  restoration	  and	  new	  beginnings	  are	  brought	  about	  through	  a	  heterosexual	  familial	  contract.	  Lurie	  imagines	  it	  thus:	  ‘The	  seed	   of	   generation,	   driven	   to	   perfect	   itself,	   driving	   deep	   into	   the	   woman’s	   body,	  driving	   to	  bring	   the	   future	   into	  being.’70	  Family,	   futurity	   itself,	   is	  dependent	  on	   the	  rather	   arrogant,	   it	   must	   be	   said,	   actions	   of	   personified	   sperm	   which	   purifies	   the	  female	  body.	   It	   is	  not	   the	   sperm	   that	   feels	   shame.	  From	   fear	  of	  miscegenation	  and	  interracial	  rape	  to	  a	  biracial	  utopia	  brought	  about	  through	  reproduction,	   it	   is	  clear	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that	  the	  family	  is	  absolutely	  central	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  unity.	  The	  sanctity	  of	  the	  family	  in	  this	  narrative	  expunges	  the	  shame	  of	  the	  female	  body	  through	  its	  transformation	  into	  a	  holy	  vessel.	  In	  a	  rare	  moment	  of	  introspective	  self-­‐analysis,	  Lurie	  asks	  himself	  ‘does	  he	  have	  it	   in	   him	   to	   be	   the	   woman?’71	   The	   book	   has	   already	   given	   us	   the	   answer.	   The	  opposition	  of	  his	  disgrace	  to	  her	  shame	  tells	  us	  that	  he	  can	  never	  be	  the	  woman,	  for	  to	   feel	   the	   shame	   of	   femininity	   in	   the	   gendered	   hierarchy	   of	   difference	   that	   the	  narrative	  constructs,	  he	  must	  live	  in	  and	  through	  a	  female	  body.	  
—CONCLUSION If	   shame	   is	   a	   feminised	  emotion,	   then	   it	   is	  because	  of	   the	   fundamental	  problem	  of	  feminine	  embodiment	  in	  a	  sexist	  society—as	  perpetually	  self-­‐aware—from	  which	  it	  arises.	  Shame	  is	  the	  one	  emotion,	  above	  all	  others,	  that	  evokes	  the	  elemental	  female	  dilemma,	  outlined	  by	  de	  Beauvoir,	  of	  having	  a	  body	  that	  is	  experienced	  existentially	  as	  a	  body-­‐for-­‐others.	   In	  a	  sexist	   culture,	   shame	   insinuates	   itself	   into	   the	  biology	  of	  woman	  such	  as	  to	  make	  it	  appear	  an	  immutable	  aspect	  of	  female	  being.	  	  The	  sexually	  specific	  phantasies	  of	  a	  phallocentric	  social	  imaginary	  produce	  the	  female	  body	  as	  the	  privileged	  site	  of	  shame	  and	  alibi	  for	  the	  herosexual	  male	  body’s	  sexual	  disgrace.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  visible	  the	  operations	  of	  gender	  upon	  the	  cultural	  production	   of	   shame,	   it	   must	   be	   detached	   from	   disgrace.	   The	   assumption	   of	  symbiotic	   unity	   in	   shame-­‐disgrace	   is	   incapable	   of	   questioning	   the	   corporeal/	  incorporeal	   taxonomy	  upon	  which	   its	  coherence	   is	  propped.	  Thus,	   it	   is	   in	  severing	  this	   connection	   that	   we	   can	   begin	   to	   see	   the	   way	   in	   which	   disgrace	   conceals	   its	  parasitic	   dependence	   upon	   shame	   as	   its	   negative	   other.	   Through	   applying	   a	  gendered	   analysis,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	  masculine	   disgrace	   is	   rhetorically	   produced	  through	   feminine	   shame	   by	   locating	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   former	   in	   the	   subjective	  position	   of	   the	   latter.	   This	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   absolving	   masculine	   interiority	   by	  locating	   shame	   outside	   the	   male	   subject.	   In	   this	   respect,	   disgrace	   is	   a	   de-­‐subjectifying	  process	  in	  which	  shame	  is	  deferred	  and	  projected	  onto	  the	  objectified	  body	   of	   the	   other:	   it	   is	   what	   allows	   the	   masculine	   subject	   to	   claim	   a	   position	   of	  supreme	  objectivity.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  productive	  of	  subjectivity	  insofar	  as	  the	  masculine	  subject	  attains	  its	  presence	  through	  the	  negation	  of	  its	  othered	  object.	  In	  Coetzee’s	   novel,	   David	   Lurie’s	   body	   undergoes	   a	   textual	   erasure,	   serving	   only	   as	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witness	  to	  his	  public	  disgrace.	  By	  contrast,	  it	  is	  the	  two	  central	  women	  in	  Disgrace—Melanie	  and	  Lucy—who	  suffer	  the	  full	  force	  of	  embodied	  shame	  through	  rape,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  starkest	  examples	  there	  is	  (along	  with	  slavery)	  of	  the	  shame	  in	  being	  a	  body-­‐for-­‐the-­‐other.	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